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Tolerance against failures and errors is an important feature of many complex 
networked systems [1,2].  It has been shown that a class of inhomogeneously wired 
networks called “scale-free”[1,3] networks can be surprisingly robust to failures, 
suggesting that socially self-organized systems such as the World-Wide Web, the 
Internet, and other kinds of social networks [4] may have significant tolerance against 
failures by virtue of their scale-free degree distribution.  I show that this finding only 
holds on the assumption that the diffusion process supported by the network is a simple 
one, requiring only a single contact in order for transmission to be successful.  
For complex contagions [5], such as the spread of cultural norms, collective 
behaviour or cooperation, multiple sources of reinforcement are needed for transmission 
to be successful [5, 6].  On networks with high levels of local clustering, as is typical of 
social networks [7-9], a scale-free degree distribution makes the social topology much 
more sensitive to failure due to accidents and errors than does a more homogeneous, 
exponential degree distribution. 
Exponential and scale-free networks are compared by using networks of the same 
size (N=10,000), average degree (<k>=4), and level of clustering (C=.25)[6].  Error 
tolerance is tested by randomly removing a fraction, f, of nodes from the network [1], 
and then measuring the average size of cascades, S (the number of nodes reached by a 
contagion), which originate from a randomly chosen seed neighbourhood.  This process 
is repeated over 1000 realizations to produce an ensemble average cascade size, <S>, 
for each value of f.   
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In order for complex contagions to propagate across a social network, the network 
not only must remain connected, but it also must have sufficient local structure [5] (Fig. 
1a).  When a scale-free network suffers random errors, it quickly reaches a critical 
fraction of removed nodes, fc~.0002, above which cascades can only reach less than half 
of the network (Fig. 1b).  This is independent of whether nodes are removed by targeted 
attack (removing the most connected nodes first) or random failure.  This weakness is 
endemic to clustered scale-free networks because of the large fraction of the population 
with minimal connectivity. 
The exponential network has more nodes with moderate degree, and thus there are 
many redundant pathways for local reinforcement.  The formation of “bottlenecks” 
(illustrated in Fig. 1a) limits complex contagions to reaching only 70% of the entire 
network.  Despite this, cascades can still reach the same fraction of the connected 
network with 5% failure as with zero failure (Fig. 1c).  Targeted attacks have a much 
greater impact on the exponential network, eventually causing cascades sizes to drop to 
zero; however, exponential networks do not have a critical transition for complex 
contagions, and are relatively robust even after losing the 100 most connected nodes 
(1%).  This tolerance of exponential networks suggests that in social networks the 
reinforcement of desired norms can be sustained despite continual network attrition due 
to death or mobility. 
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Figure 1.  Spread of simple and complex contagions on scale-free and exponential 
networks.  a, Minimally complex contagions require that each node have 2 (but not 
more than 100%) of their neighbours activated in order to become activated.  This can 
cause “bottlenecks” where a contagion (blue nodes) cannot spread to reach every node 
in a connected network. b, Average size of cascades of complex contagions as fraction f 
of nodes are removed from a clustered scale-free network by random failure (dotted 
line) or targeted attack (solid line), and the connectedness of the network (solid line 
with circles) as the size of cascades of simple contagions. c, Average size of cascades 
on an exponential network for complex contagion with random failure (dotted line) and 
targeted attack (solid line), and for simple contagion (solid line with circles). 
 
